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first glance at credit card networks
reveals a complex transaction and
ripayment structure. A typical credit
card transaction has four parties: the cus-
tomer, the bank that issued the customer’s
card, the merchant, and the merchant’s
bank.’ The four parties are complementary
links in the transaction. The transaction
begins when the customer (lower left
corner ofFigure 1) makes a $100 purchase
from the merchant with a credit card.
The merchant is paid less than rhe cus-
tomer pays to the card-issuing bank. For
example, the merchant may collect only
$96 on the $100 purchase; the difference is
called the discount. Thus there are at least
two possibilities of collecting rent: first,
by the card-issuing hank through the
interchange fee and second, by the
merchant hank, which collects the differ-
ence between the discount and the
interchange fee.
Three out of the four parties of a
typical transaction compete with other
firms that sell substitute goods orservices,
Clearly merchants compete with other
merchants for customers; merchant banks
compete with other banks for merchants;
and card-issuing banks compete for cus-
tonners. To compete, firms may create
brand names, differentiate their products,
and add extraservices to the basic service
that they provide. Thus competition in
credit card networks is complex. Never-
theless, credit card networks adhere to
the basic principles of operation of all
netw-orks. To understand credit card net-
works better, we turn to a general analysis
of competition in networks.
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A comprehensive analysis of the basic
structure of networks and a survey of
recent research on networks can be found
in Economides and White (1993) and
Economides (forthcoming), respectively
We borrow and summarize a number of
those results here. A central feature of net-
works is that network goods or services
exhibit network externalities: adding
another customer adds value to the
existing customers of the network. A con-
sumer’s willingness to pay for a network
good or service increases with the level of
expected network sales. In general, network
externalities arise out of the complemen-
tarity between the various pieces of the
network. A physical network is made of
complementary cotuponents. For exam-
ple, in Figure 2, a simple star telephone
network, consumers are connected to a
switch, S. A phone call between A and B
(good ASB) comprises two complementary
components, AS and SB. That is, cus-
tomer A can use the telephone services
only by talking to another network cus-
tomer, and in consuming good ASB, both
customers A and B simultaneously use the
switching service, S.
The analysis extends to virtual
networks. Virtual networks have comple-
mentary components, that is, components
of vertically related products. Examples of
virtual networks include the conuhination
of computer software and hardware, and
the collection of compatible computer cen-
tral processing units and video monitors.
The Visa credit card virtual network has a
Visa issuingbank, a merchant bank, a mer-
chant that accepts Visa cards, and a customer
with a Visa card. An integrated system of
automated teller machines (ATMs) is a
network that includes banks that issue
ATM cards, the system that provides ATMs
and the data processing functions neces-
sary for their operation, and the customers
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who use their ATM cards. One may even
think of buyers and sellers in a financial
exchange, such as the NYSE, as constitut-
ing a virtual network,~
The network structure of Figure 3 can
be interpreted as a long-distance network.
One may imagine that custonners Ai are
in New York. while customers Bj are in
San Francisco. Then a phone call from
i’~ew York to San Francisco passes through
the circuits of NYNEX (Ai SA), the lines of
AT&T, MCI or Sprint in the long-distance
part (SA SB), and the lines of Pacific Bell
(SB Bj). A local phone call within New
York is Ai SA Aj. Both Figures 2 and 3
depict two-waynetworks; transactions
that have the same endpoints hut go in
opposite directions are distinct. For
instance, a call from Al to BI, which is
charged to caller Al, is distinct from a call
fromBl to Al.
The network structure of Figure 3 can
also be interpreted as depicting an ATM
network. Then Ai is an ATM and Bj is a
bank. Customers of any bank B] can use
any ATM Ai. In this interpretation, the
only transactions forwhich there is
demand are the long-distance ones, for
example, Ai SA SB Bj. There is no demand
for any local transactions, such as Ai SA Aj
and Bk SB BI. In the ATM interpretation,
this is a one-way network because there is
no sense of direction.
The existence of network externalities
implies that an extra sale has positiveben-
efits to other buyers which the last buyer
does notreceive. It also implies that per-
fect competition is inefficient; it does not
decentralize the optimal (social-welfare
maxinizing) allocation. To reach optimality
requires two-part tariffs or other compli-
cated nonlinear pricing schemes. Perfect
cotnpetition fails because it doesn’t
internalize the externality The much
debated question of whether monopoly
can do better is discussed in Economides
and Himmelherg (1995), who conclude
that monopoly cannot do better as long
as no two-part tariffs are used. Thus
there is nojustification for monopoly
on optimality grounds because ofthe
network externalities.
Despite significant research, there is
no comprehensive analysis of oligopoly in
networks.3 This is essentially because the
network structure implies that competition
in a network industry is both for individ-
ual components and for end-to-end
service. Incompatibilities—for example,
refusal to interconnect or refusal of
access—limit the varieties of end-to-end
service available to customers, as well as
the extent of network externalities. The
general flavor of current knowledge on the
issue of cotnpatibility is that a firm with a
small market share desires compatibility
more than a firm with a large share,4 Thus
incumbents may want to thwart entry
through the creation of artificialincompat-
ibities or through refusal of access.5
JOINT VENTURES
joint ventures in network industries
can have strong positive effects by setting
compatibility standards and through coor-
dination,~It is best ifa joint venture is
among firms that are only vertically relat-
ed; end-to-end railroads, manufacturers of
complementary components, and manu-
facturers and retailers are examples. If
firms are also horizontally related, that is,
they compete in some segments, there may
be significant problems. For example, in
an extreme case, a ioint venture may he a
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If incumbents hove the possibil-
ity of collecting ‘interconnee
ton fees” to give occess to the
network to on entrant, they
moy implement a price squeeze
through high interconnection
fees rather than refusing to
deol or interconnect. See
Economides ond Woroch
(1992).
6 See Corlton ond Klamer




case, the refusal of access to the joint ven-
ture is similar to the refusal to intercon-
nect in a network or a decision by a manu-
facturer to make the components of its
product incompatible with components of
other manufacturers.
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The credit card virtual network of
Figure 1 is similar to the long-distance (or
ATM) network of Figure 3, where SA Al
are the customers, SB Bj are the mer-
chants, and the service SASB is provided
by the participating banks. An important
difference between a credit card network
and a long-distance network is that today a
long-distance network has full interoper-
ability that is, any call can go to any desti-
nation irrespective of the carrier. In con-
trast, credit card networks are incompati-
ble. For example, a Visa transaction is
only between a Visa cardholder, a Visa
bank, and a Visa merchant.
Given that credit card networks are
incompatible, entry is a crucial issue.
Admission of new members should, in
B2 principle, intensify competition in the
pricing of components that the members
of the network provide, that is, intra-net-
work competition. If members of the net-
work (joint venture) cannot participare in
a competing network, usuallythat should
diminish competition among end-to-end
services, that is, inter-network competi-
tion. In exceptional cases, this exclusion
could promote competition. However, it is
likely that the refusal to allow a member
of, for example, the Discover Card net-
work to issue a Visa Card and therefore
have access to the Visa network, reduced
inter-network competition.
Furthermore, in the Visa case,
Discover wanted to enterwith a long list of
customers (as did AT&T earlier). Besides
intensifying intra-network competition,
the addition of a significant number of
new customers would havecreated signifi-
cant external benefits to all Visa banks,
merchants, and customers because of the
associated network externalities, Thus the
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vehicle for blatant horizontal price fixing
or other forms ofcollusive pricing of the
products of the joint venture.7 Alterna-
tively a joint venture may be a vehiclefor
implicit coordination among competitors.
Finally ajoint venture may be a vehicle to
keep mavericks out of the industry In that
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